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After an imported case of Marburg hemorrhagic fever 
was reported in 2008 in the Netherlands, control measures 
to prevent transmission were implemented. To evaluate 
consequences of these measures, we administered a 
structured questionnaire to 130 contacts classifi ed as either 
having high-risk or low-risk exposure to body fl uids of the 
case-patient; 77 (59.2%) of 130 contacts responded. A total 
of 67 (87.0%) of 77 respondents agreed that temperature 
monitoring and reporting was necessary, signifi cantly more 
often among high-risk than low-risk contacts (p<0.001). Strict 
compliance with daily temperature monitoring decreased 
from 80.5% (62/77) during week 1 to 66.2% (51/77) during 
week 3. Contacts expressed concern about development 
of Marburg hemorrhagic fever (58.4%, 45/77) and infecting 
a family member (40.2%, 31/77). High-risk contacts had 
signifi cantly higher scores on psychological impact scales 
(p<0.001) during and after the monitoring period. Public 
health authorities should specifi cally address consequences 
of control measures on the daily life of contacts.
In July 2008 in the Netherlands, an imported case of Marburg hemorrhagic fever (MHF) (1) was diagnosed 
in a person after possible exposure in a bat cave in Uganda. 
MHF is caused by Marburg virus, which belongs to the 
family Filoviridae (2,3). The main route of transmission is 
by direct contact with blood or body fl uids (4). The virus 
was discovered in 1967 during a laboratory outbreak in 
Marburg, Germany (5,6). Apart from this person, since the 
outbreak in Marburg, MHF has been diagnosed only once 
outside Africa (7).
Because of the high case-fatality rate and propensity 
for further transmission, a case of MHF is considered to 
be a public health emergency of international concern and 
requires prompt intervention to isolate the case-patient and 
trace and monitor all contacts for early signs of disease. 
Persons at risk for contracting MHF caused by prior or 
ongoing contact with an infected person were identifi ed by 
means of a public health investigation conducted by public 
health services. The national outbreak response team issued 
guidelines for classifi cation of these contacts and control 
measures, including restrictions on leaving the country.
Imported cases of hemorrhagic fever and other severe 
diseases with the potential to spread among health care 
workers and the general population have a small, yet 
realistic chance of occurring in the Western world, as 
was the situation with Ebola fever and Lassa fever (8–
12). Outbreaks can also originate from other sources, as 
was the case with Ebola-Reston virus (13). Because there 
are no alternative interventions, such as vaccination or 
prophylactic treatment, to protect contacts from acquiring 
MHF, control measures are aimed at early identifi cation 
of possible case-patients and isolating them from the rest 
of the population. However, we do not know how persons 
exposed to MHF respond when confronted with control 
measures. To date, the consequences of measures to control 
outbreaks (e.g., monitoring, quarantine) have only been 
partially investigated for diseases that are not comparable 
to MHF from the point of view of routes and risk of 
transmission, e.g., severe acute respiratory syndrome or 
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infl uenza (14–17). Evidence is needed to determine the 
effectiveness of follow-up procedures for MHF contacts.
To evaluate the consequences and the psychological 
effect of control measures on contacts’ daily life, a 
retrospective cohort study (including serologic testing) 
was undertaken among 130 contacts of the person in the 
Netherlands in 2008 who acquired MHF. Contacts were 
categorized as high-risk or low-risk on the basis of their 
exposure history. We describe criteria to optimize the effect 
of control measures and provide proper care to contacts 
exposed to a person-to-person transmissible virus with the 
potential to cause severe disease.
Methods
This study was determined to be part of the public 
health response to the imported case of MHF and follow-
up of contacts. Therefore, explicit ethical evaluation was 
not necessary.
Case-Patient Description
On July 2, 2008, after returning from a visit to Uganda 
from June 5 through June 28, a 41-year-old woman showed 
development of chills and high fever. She was admitted to 
hospital A on July 5. Initially, hemorrhagic fever was not 
included in the differential diagnosis and she was placed 
in a general ward among other patients, without specifi c 
contact precautions. Because she later showed clinical 
deterioration, liver failure, and tendency to hemorrhage, 
hemorrhagic fever was suspected and she was transferred 
to hospital B on July 7. In hospital B, she was placed in 
strict isolation in accordance with guidelines prescribed for 
pathogens belonging to Hazard Group 4 (18). We placed 
the patient in a single room with negative air pressure 
ventilation and an anteroom for 2 reasons. First, although 
evidence for airborne transmission of MHF in humans has 
not been documented, transmission by aerosols has been 
demonstrated in animal models (7). Second, the patient 
was likely to undergo aerosol-generating procedures (e.g., 
endotracheal intubation) while in the latter stages of illness 
when viral loads in body fl uids were expected to be high.
On July 10, the diagnosis of MHF was confi rmed; the 
next day, the patient died. A complete case history and the 
public health response have been reported (1).
Control Measures
The outbreak response team formulated measures 
for follow-up of contacts considered to be at risk for 
exposure. Measures were based on preexisting national and 
international guidelines on management of hemorrhagic 
fever caused by fi loviruses (18–20). The patient was 
considered to be potentially infectious from the onset 
of fever (July 2) until death (July 11). The period of 
monitoring contacts was set at 21 days after the last contact 
with the patient or patient body fl uids. The public health 
service traced the contacts in the community. The hospital 
hygienist and occupational physician, and attending 
physicians were responsible for in-hospital contacts. 
Contacts were provided with written instructions (Table 1).
Contacts classifi ed as at high risk for contracting the 
disease (i.e., had unprotected contact with the patient or her 
body fl uids) were asked to measure their temperature twice 
a day and report it to the health care provider. Furthermore, 
they were prohibited from leaving the country and were 
told to report any intention to leave to the public health 
authority. Contacts were asked to notify the    assigned 
health care provider immediately if they had fever (body 
temperature >38°C measured twice at least 12 hours apart) 
or any abnormal symptoms (e.g., vomiting, headache, 
abdominal pain, diarrhea, jaundice). Contacts who had 
handled the patient or her body fl uids while carrying out 
strict isolation measures were perceived to be at low risk 
for exposure. They were asked to measure their temperature 
twice a day, but only to report a temperature >38°C. This 
group was strongly encouraged not to travel abroad.
Study Population
A retrospective cohort study involving the 130 contacts 
was conducted by using an online questionnaire. High-risk 
contacts (n = 64) included household contacts, health care 
providers at the general practice, those involved in patient 
care at hospital A (nurses, physicians, and laboratory 
workers), patients sharing the same hospital ward in hospital 
A, and cleaning staff. Low-risk contacts (n = 66) included 
health care and laboratory workers at hospital B who had 
all taken appropriate personal protective measures. Data 
were collected from December 2008 through February 
2009, which was 5–7 months after possible exposure. At 
the same time, serologic testing was conducted to assess 
asymptomatic transmission.
Variables and Instruments
Questionnaire
We recorded personal characteristics of respondents 
and any symptoms during the monitoring period. The 
questionnaire (62 questions) addressed understanding 
of control measures, clarity of instructions, reported 
compliance with measures, and perceived interference with 
daily life (e.g., restrictions on social life, diffi culties with 
control measures, extra costs incurred, and fear of becoming 
infected). To develop questions regarding interference and 
reported compliance, we drew from the current literature 
on the effect of restrictive measures during outbreaks 
(14,15,21).
Questions regarding clarity of instructions and 
understanding measures were based on parts of the 
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Consumer Quality Index Instrument of the Netherlands 
Institute for Health Services Research (Rotterdam, the 
Netherlands), which was derived from the Consumer 
Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems Survey 
developed and funded by the US Agency for Health 
Care Research and Quality (Rockville, MD, USA) (22). 
Depending on the type of question, respondents were asked 
to answer either yes or no questions, or to choose an option 
on Likert scales of 1–5 (1, completely disagree; 2, disagree; 
3, neutral; 4, agree; and 5, strongly agree or 1, never; 2, 
seldom; 3, sometimes; 4, often; 5, always).
Impact of Event Scale
To evaluate stress levels, we used the Revised 
Impact of Event Scale (IES-R; Dutch version), a 22-item 
international instrument designed to measure situations 
in life that are perceived as stressful (23). The instrument 
was divided into 3 subscales: intrusion (e.g., recurrent 
thoughts); avoidance (e.g., avoiding reminders of the 
event); and hyperarousal (e.g., concentration and sleeping 
problems). Each subscale contained questions derived from 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
criteria (4th edition) for posttraumatic stress disorder (24). 
Items were scored on a Likert scale of 0–4 (0, not at all; 
1, a little bit; 3, quite a bit; 4, extremely), which added up 
to a maximum score of 88. A score >20 was considered 
an indicator of posttraumatic stress disorder (14,15). We 
assessed recalled stress during the monitoring period (IES 
during) and persisting stress during the 7 days before the 
completion of the questionnaire (IES after).
Statistical Analysis
Data were analyzed by using SPSS version 18 (SPSS 
Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). Descriptive statistics were 
calculated. Means and SDs were calculated for answers 
given on the Likert scale. Results were stratifi ed by type of 
exposure risk (i.e., high or low risk for disease transmission). 
Differences in proportions were calculated by using the χ2 
test. Differences in means were calculating by using the 
Student t test. A p value <0.05 was considered signifi cant.
We constructed overall scales. The compliance with 
measures scale (Cronbach α 0.71) included 4 questions 
regarding temperature monitoring, temperature reporting, 
and prohibition on travel. The interference scale (Cronbach 
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Table 1. Instructions for contacts of a person with Marburg hemorrhagic fever, by risk contact group, the Netherlands, 2008* 
Characteristic Instruction
You have been assigned to the high-risk category You have shared the household (or the ward) with the patient. You have 
cared for the patient in the hospital without wearing PPE. You had or might 
have had unprotected contact (without PPE) with the blood or body fluids of 
the patient. 
The following restrictions have been imposed on you Remain in the neighborhood of your home address during the monitoring 
period of 3 weeks after last possible contact (date). Stay in contact with the 
health care provider you have been assigned (the public health service, the 
hospital hygiene specialist, or the occupational medicine specialist). Do not 
leave the country. Cancel or postpone a holiday trip abroad. 
 Control measures during  monitoring period Inform your health care provider if you use temperature-lowering medication. 
Measure your temperature in the morning and evening. Use your own 
thermometer (one that is not to be used by others) and write down your 
temperature accurately. Disinfect the thermometer with 70% alcohol after 
every use and wash your hands with soap and water. Contact your health 
care provider daily and provide him or her with information about your health 
and temperature. If you have a fever (2 consecutive temperature 
measurements t38°C 12 h apart), vomiting, headache, stomach ache, 
diarrhea, jaundice, or cough, immediately contact your care provider. Stay at 
home and restrict all contacts with others until further instructions from your 
health care provider. Only use your own toilet. 
You have been assigned to the low-risk category You cared for the patient (using adequate PPE) while she was admitted to the 
hospital and in accordance with a strict isolation protocol. You had contact 
with blood or body fluids of the patient while using effective PPE. 
 Control measures during monitoring period Inform your health care provider if you use temperature-lowering medications. 
You are strongly advised not to leave the country during the monitoring period 
of 3 weeks after the last possible contact with the patient or patient body 
fluids (date). Measure your temperature daily in the morning and evening. 
Use your own thermometer (one that is not to be used by others) and write 
down your temperature accurately. Disinfect the thermometer with 70% 
alcohol after every use and wash your hands with soap and water. If you 
have a fever (2 consecutive temperature measurements t38°C 12 h apart), 
immediately contact the health care provider you have been assigned (public 
health service, the hospital hygiene specialist, or the occupational medicine 
specialist). Stay at home and restrict all contacts with others until further 
instructions from your care provider. Only use your own toilet. 
*PPE, personal protective equipment. 
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α 0.64) included 11 questions on perceived restrictions on 
social life, diffi culties with control measures, extra costs, 
and anxiety of contacts and their families. The clarity of 
instructions scale (Cronbach α 0.82) included 5 questions 
on explicitness, completeness, unambiguity, confusion, and 
redundancy of the provided instructions. The overall scale 
for understanding of measures (items regarding awareness 
of the measures and their rationale) proved invalid and was 
not used in further analysis.
To determine which variables infl uenced stress levels 
during the monitoring period, we developed a linear 
regression model by using the IES during monitoring as 
a dependent variable and personal characteristics (sex, 
education, age), risk level, clarity of instructions scale, 
compliance scale, and interference scale as independent 
variables. The same model was constructed by using the 
IES after the monitoring period as the dependent variable.
Serologic Testing
Serologic testing was performed by using an 
immunofl uorescence antibody (IFA) assay with blood 
samples collected from contacts 5–7 months after the 
monitoring period. IFA test slides were prepared at the 
Bernhard Nocht Institute for Tropical Medicine (Hamburg, 
Germany) by using the patient strain. Laboratory methods 
have been reported (1).
Results
Response
Of 130 eligible participants, 78 (60.0%) completed 
the questionnaire. One person provided systematically 
inconsistent answers and was excluded, which left 
77 respondents (59.2%) for statistical analysis. The 
response rate was 70.3% (45/64) in the high-risk group 
and 48.5% (32/66) in the low-risk group (Table 2). Of 
the 77 respondents, 46 (59.7%) were female, 44 (57.1%) 
did not have children in the household, and 11 (14.3%) 
lived alone. Mean age was 38 years in the high-risk group 
and 43 years in the low-risk group (this difference was 
not signifi cant). The high-risk group had more women 
(33/45, 73.3%) than the low-risk group (13/32, 40.6%) 
(p = 0.004) and had a lower education level (Table 2). 
Respondents were comparable to nonrespondents with 
respect to sex (M:F ratio 40.0%:60.0% vs. 42.0%:58.0%). 
During the monitoring period, nonspecifi c symptoms 
(those commonly occurring during the prodromal phase 
of hemorrhagic fever syndromes, e.g., headache, malaise, 
fatigue) (2) developed occasionally in some contacts, but 
no signifi cant differences were observed between the risk 
groups.
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Table 2. Characteristics and self-reported signs and symptoms of persons who had contact with a Marburg hemorrhagic fever patient,
the Netherlands, 2008* 
Characteristic  High-risk contact, n = 45, no. (%) Low-risk contact, n = 32, no. (%) p value† 
Sex   0.004
 F 33 (73.0) 13 (40.0) 
 M 12 (37.0) 19 (60.0) 
Age, y   0.127 
 <25 13 (29.0) 2 (6.2) 
 26–35 9 (21.0) 8 (25.2) 
 36–45 10 (22.0) 10 (31.2) 
 46–55 10 (22.0) 11 (34.3) 
 56–65 3 (6.0) 1 (3.1) 
Education   0.002 
 Secondary 8 (18.0) 1 (3.0) 
 Vocational 17 (37.0) 4 (12.0) 
 Higher professional 15 (34.0) 22 (70.0) 
 University 5 (11.0) 5 (15.0) 
Health status   0.047 
 Excellent 11 (24.0) 15 (47.0) 
 Very good 19 (42.0) 6 (18.7) 
 Good 15 (34.0) 11 (34.3) 
Reported conditions during monitoring period    
 Temperature >38°C 2 (4.4) 2 (6.2) 0.901 
 Headache 17 (37.7) 8 (25.0) 0.064 
 Myalgia 5 (11.1) 1 (3.1) 0.407 
 Malaise 13 (29.0) 10 (31.2) 0.513 
 Nausea 6 (13.3) 2 (6.2) 0.429 
 Abdominal pain 6 (13.3) 3 (9.3) 0.482 
 Fatigue 11 (24.0) 6 (18.5) 0.222 
 Vomiting 1 (4.5) 0 0.399 
 Diarrhea 6 (13.3) 1 (3.1) 0.247 
*High-risk contact, unprotected contact with the patient or her body fluids; low-risk contact, contact with the patient or her body fluids while following strict 
isolation measures. Boldface indicates statistical significance (p<0.05). 
†By Ȥ2 test. 
Control Measures for Marburg Hemorrhagic Fever
Understanding Measures
Of the 77 respondents, 60 (77.9%) were aware of the 
request not to leave the country, and 17 (22.1%) chose the 
neutral option. Of 60 contacts aware of the request, 54 
(90.0%) in the high-risk group agreed with this request (p 
= 0.04). Reasons given for negative answers were no direct 
contact with the patient and thus no risk (n = 2), imperative 
reasons to leave the country such as illness in the family 
(n = 2), travel restrictions were meant for others, not for 
me (n = 1), and borders do not stop diseases (n = 1). All 
respondents were aware of the need to measure temperature 
twice a day, 67 (87.0%) agreed with the necessity of 
measuring and reporting temperature, and 7 (9.1%) had no 
opinion. Not feeling ill was the reason for disagreement 
in the remaining 3 (3.8%) respondents. Only 58 (75.3%) 
of the 77 respondents correctly identifi ed the rationale of 
temperature monitoring. Respondents in the high-risk group 
agreed more often than their low-risk counterparts with the 
necessity of daily measuring and reporting for temperature 
(mean ± SD of agreement in the high-risk group 4.7 ± 1.0 
vs. 1.6 ± 1.3 in the low-risk group) (p<0.001). Written 
instructions with detailed information on the control 
measures were received by 61 (79.2%) of 77 respondents. 
Of these 61 respondents, 45 (73.7%) found this information 
to be clear, 40 (65.6%) complete, 37 (60.6%) unequivocal, 
4 (6.5%) confusing, and 3 (5.0%) redundant. There were no 
signifi cant differences between the risk groups.
Compliance with Measures
Of 45 respondents who were prohibited from traveling 
(high-risk group), 17 (37.7%) had planned a holiday trip 
abroad, of whom 12 (70.6%) cancelled the holiday trip 
during the surveillance period, and 1 (5.9%) postponed the 
trip. Two (11.8%) high-risk contacts were already abroad 
when the diagnosis in the index case was made and 2 
(11.8%) other contacts left the country a few days before 
the end of the surveillance period, despite prohibition 
on travel. Risk management in these persons, including 
communication with government authorities in countries 
to which they traveled, has been reported (1). Temperature 
was monitored twice a day by 62 (80.5%) of 77 persons, 
and 75 (97.4%) of 77 had a thermometer at their immediate 
disposal. Strict compliance with daily temperature 
monitoring decreased from 80.5% (62/77) in week 1 to 
66.2% (51/77) in week 3. Differences per risk group per 
week in reported compliance with temperature monitoring 
and reporting are shown in Table 3.
Interference of Measures with Daily Life
The prohibition on leaving the country was perceived 
as diffi cult by 18 (23.4%) of 77 respondents; 11 (14.3%) 
perceived serious restrictions on their social life, and 24 
(31.2%) reported feeling stressed on a regular basis during 
monitoring. Daily temperature monitoring was believed 
to be troublesome by 25 (32.5%) of 77. Extra costs were 
involved for 19 (24.6%) of the contacts. The questionnaire 
did not ask for specifi cation of costs incurred. Of 47 health 
care workers among respondents, 13 (27.6%) intensifi ed 
adherence to infection prevention guidelines at work during 
the monitoring period (mean ± SD intensifi ed adherence in 
the high-risk group 1.3 ± 0.4 vs. 1.03 ± 0.2 in the low-risk 
group) (p = 0.006). Sustained and intensifi ed adherence to 
infection prevention at work after the monitoring period 
ended was reported by 10 (21.3%) of 47.
Being identifi ed as a contact caused anxiety in 
respondents, as refl ected in the high percentage who were 
afraid of contracting MHF (45/77, 58.4%), those who were 
concerned about infecting other members of their household 
(31/77, 40.3%), or those who were afraid that a colleague 
might have been unknowingly infected by the index patient 
(35/77, 45.5%). Of 77 respondents, 28 (36.4%) reported that 
their family members were disturbed by control measures. 
Furthermore, 31 (40.3%) of 77 reported that their family 
members expressed anxiety about becoming infected, and 
25 (32.5%) of 77 reported that their partners were disturbed 
by restrictive control measures. The results on the overall 
interference scale were compared and showed that control 
measures caused more interference with daily life (lower 
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Table 3. Compliance with temperature monitoring and reporting in persons who had contact with a person with Marburg hemorrhagic
fever, the Netherlands, 2008* 
Variable High-risk group score, mean (SD) Low-risk group score, mean (SD) p value† 
Temperature monitoring week    
 1 4.87 (0.63) 4.25 (1.16) 0.004 
 2 4.87 (0.63) 3.84 (1.30) <0.0001 
 3 4.82 (0.68) 3.34 (1.54) <0.0001 
Temperature reporting week    
 1 4.73 (1.01) 1.56 (1.37) <0.0001 
 2 4.73 (1.01) 1.50 (1.34) <0.0001 
 3 4.71 (1.01) 1.50 (1.34) <0.0001 
*Answers were given on a 5-point Likert scale, according to the following categories: 1, never; 2, seldom; 3, sometimes; 4, often; 5, always. High-risk 
contact, unprotected contact with the patient or her body fluids; low-risk contact, contact with the patient or her body fluids while following strict isolation 
measures. 
†By 2-sample Student t test assuming unequal variances. Because of the relatively large sample sizes of 45 and 32 and  data that consisted of scores 
from 1 through 5 with the indicated SDs, this test is justified by the central limit theorem and because the t distribution with 75 = 45 + 32 – 2 df is almost 
identical with that of a normal distribution. All p values were statistically significant (p<0.05). 
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mean ± SD) in the high-risk group (mean ± SD 1.5 ± 0.3 vs. 
1.8 ± 0.2; p<0.001) than in the low-risk group.
Impact of Event Scale
Means were calculated on the basis of the answers on 
the IES and subscale domains (intrusion, avoidance, and 
hyperarousal). Overall psychological distress was measured 
by the mean ± SD score on the IES during monitoring (2.8 
± 2.6, range 0.2–10) and 5–7 months after monitoring 0.9 
(0.9 ± 1.7, range 0–9.5; p<0.001). Despite the low overall 
mean score, high individual scores were observed (Figure). 
On the subscale domains, the mean scores were higher 
during the monitoring period than after it, and the highest 
scores were reported in the high-risk group.
In the linear regression model, the score on the 
interference scales was a predictor of the score of the IES 
during monitoring, which measured the psychological 
effect of this event (p<0.001). After monitoring ended, the 
remaining psychological effect measured by the IES score 
was infl uenced by the degree of interference (p<0.001) 
and level of education (p = 0.015); persons with a lower 
education level reported more psychological consequences 
(Table 4).
Serologic Testing
IFA serologic testing was conducted in 85 (65.4%) of 
130 participants, which represented 50 (78.1%) of 64 in the 
high-risk group and 35 (53.0%) of 66 in the low-risk group. 
All serum samples were negative for IgG and IgM against 
Marburg virus.
Discussion
Being at risk for acquiring MHF had a measurable 
psychological effect and personal consequences (such 
as restrictions on social life) on respondents in both risk 
contact groups. We will discuss implications for persons 
who have to adhere to control measures, discuss the 
psychological effect of these measures, and refl ect on the 
prerequisites for applying control measures.
Compliance with control measures was reported 
as diffi cult to include in daily life, a fi nding consistent 
with reports concerning a patient with imported Lassa 
hemorrhagic fever (12,25). Some practical problems need 
to be addressed to facilitate compliance with temperature 
monitoring and prohibitions on leaving the country. 
Problems were related to comprehensiveness of measures. 
Some respondents had already paid for a holiday trip and 
subsequently had to cancel it. Increased costs that persons 
incurred imply that compensation policies (e.g., insurance) 
should  be explained or made available in preparedness 
plans (26). Practical constraints related to temperature 
monitoring should be averted by making use of online 
registration systems and modern technologies to contact 
persons and facilitate communication with health care 
providers.
Although temperature monitoring remains the primary 
method of detecting onset of fever and enabling follow-up 
of contacts during the incubation period (6), appropriateness 
of once a day vs. twice a day monitoring is a disputed issue. 
In accordance with guidelines in the Netherlands (19) and 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Interim 
Guidance (20), we implemented twice a day temperature 
monitoring. In outbreak situations, once a day monitoring 
is usually followed. Although twice a day monitoring is 
not an evidence-based recommendation, we applied it to be 
able to discriminate between a single episode of fever and 
sustained fever needing follow-up. Given our experience, 
twice a day monitoring is appropriate for management of 
high-risk contacts of a single case-patient or few patients 
with imported cases, but might not be feasible in every 
outbreak situation.
Our study shows that control measures had a 
substantial psychological effect on contacts and members 
of their household. By quantifying the recalled level of 
stress at 2 time points, we demonstrated that stress-related 
complaints persisted for a longer period, thus enlarging the 
body of evidence built on the basis of previous outbreaks 
(14,15,27–30). We found the interference scale score to 
be the main predictor of perceived stress, suggesting that 
the disturbance experienced in daily life determines the 
magnitude of the psychological effect.
In the light of these fi ndings, what should the 
prerequisites be for applying control measures? Public 
health authorities in charge of crisis management need to be 
aware of diffi culties and stress-related issues experienced 
by persons to whom the measures apply and address 
them systematically in the crisis guidelines. Apart from 
overcoming practical barriers, public health authorities 
should address the psychosocial well-being of persons 
being monitored and their family members. Although health 
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Figure. Distribution of individual scores on the impact of event 
scale (IES) during and after (a 7-day period before completion of a 
questionnaire) the monitoring period among contacts of the person 
with Marburg hemorrhagic fever, the Netherlands, 2008. Each circle 
indicates 1 person. A higher score indicates a higher level of stress.
Control Measures for Marburg Hemorrhagic Fever
care in contacts is focused mostly on early identifi cation 
of somatic symptoms, concerns, anxiety, and stress 
experienced by those involved are also crucial. Guidelines 
should emphasize the need for individual support to assess 
and manage stress and to address questions about personal 
risks (29).
Finally, occasional incidents of noncompliance 
with the prohibition on leaving the country have policy 
implications, which make intergovernmental collaboration 
necessary. Restricting freedom to travel during the 
incubation period of persons with high-risk exposure to 
a transmissible pathogen obliged by international health 
regulations to be reported requires effective legislation, 
an issue that should ideally be dealt with before such an 
incident occurs. Although voluntary compliance, based 
on effective communication and trust in the authorities, 
is the most appropriate approach (31), should compulsory 
means be necessary in the Netherlands, emergency legal 
provisions are now in place to impose travel restrictions 
and to monitor the health status of contacts who have been 
exposed to certain pathogens.
Despite being sent reminders, the response rate of 
participants was only 60.0%. This limits interpretation 
of results because motives for noncompliance remain 
unknown. As in most retrospective studies, we also need 
to acknowledge the chance of recall bias, which might 
infl uence recollection of experiences. Another limitation 
was inherent to the study design, which required answers 
only from contacts. Thus, consequences of control measures 
on members of the household could only be assessed 
indirectly. Despite the limitations of IFA (32), serologic 
fi ndings strongly suggest that none of the contacts who 
provided a blood sample had become asymptomatically 
infected.
The strengths of this study are 1) systematic evaluation 
of compliance with measures and interference of measures 
with daily life, and 2) quantifi cation of psychological 
effects of these measures during and after this major event, 
which had received much attention in the media. We 
reinforce the hypothesis that psychological symptoms may 
persist longer. Public health authorities need to be aware 
of the immediate and long-term effects that measures can 
have on persons being monitored.
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